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This article analyses if and how recent changes within the Swiss political system have influenced different aspects of protest politics (e.g. level, issues, action repertoires, and transnationalization). We argue that opportunities for mobilization have emerged in recent years due to changes in the institutionalized political context and that these changes have at least partially led to a resurgence of protest activities in the early 2000s. In a longitudinal perspective, it is however rather moderate. Additionally, new social movements still dominate Swiss protest politics. Although social and migration-related questions gained in salience, the changes are not as dramatic as in the case of party politics. The rise of a new integration-demarcation cleavage has not (yet) shaken Swiss protest politics as heavily as Swiss party politics. Finally, even though they are not integrated into a pronounced new protest cycle, the early 2000s are marked by the global justice movement. In this context, we observe a slight radicalization of the action repertoire and police reactions, which is at least partially explained by the emergence of new “transnational” sites of contention.

Keywords: Switzerland • Protest • Social Movements • Political Opportunity Structures • Transnational Mobilization

Introduction

The article analyses if and how recent changes within the Swiss political system have influenced protest politics. In line with the political process approach in social movement research (for recent overviews, see Kriesi 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004), we look at external opportunities and constraints offered by the broader political context that affect the choice of protest strategies. We argue that opportunities for mobilization have emerged in recent years due to changes in the institutionalized political

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1 We thank Martin Dolezal, Edgar Grande, Marc Helbling, Dominic Hoeglinger, Hans-peter Kriesi, Bruno Wüest and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
context and that these changes have at least partially remobilized social movements in Switzerland. Specifically, we examine aspects of the political context, such as the cleavage structure, the institutional opportunities and informal strategies of the state, and the configuration of power within the institutional arenas. Subsequently, we analyze whether changes in these aspects of the political context have had an impact on a number of features of protest: the levels of mobilization, the action repertoires, the issues addressed, the actors involved, and the scope of protest. The latter aspect is of particular importance, as we assume that the changes in Swiss institutional politics stem, at least in part, from broader transformations at the transnational level. Our goal is to stress some of the consequences of such transformations for protest politics.

We build on an increasingly rich tradition of earlier studies on protest politics and social movements in Switzerland. However, the changing political context of protest mobilization in the 1990s and early 2000s has not yet been systematically linked to up-to-date data on protest activities in Switzerland. We attempt to fill this research gap with a protest event analysis covering the period from 1975 to 2005. With our methodology, we also continue an important endeavor in Swiss political science dating back to the path breaking study of Kriesi et al. (1981) which, for the first time, assessed the levels, forms, and issues of different political activation events. The present paper is, furthermore, a complement to recent studies on the transformation of Swiss politics that tend to neglect its protest side (e.g. Giugni and Sciarini 2008; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Vatter 2008).

The Changing Political Context for Protest Politics in Switzerland since the 1990s

In order to outline the changing political context for protest politics in Switzerland, we rely on the conceptualization of political opportunity structures proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995; see Kriesi 2004: 69–79), who distinguish between three sets of variables: the general structural setting, the configuration of power, and the interaction context. As we are above all interested in rather long-term evolutions and not in movement- and mobilization-

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2 Monographs covering different Swiss social movements and protest activities include Giugni (1995); Giugni and Passy (1999); Kriesi (1985); Kriesi et al. (1981); Tackenberg and Wisler (2007) and Wisler (1994). For a recent overview on social movement activities and research in Switzerland, see Giugni (2006).
specific instances, we focus on the first two sets of variables. We therefore describe (1) the changes and continuities in the *general structural setting* for political mobilization, which consists of the cleavages structure, the formal institutional structure of the state and its informal strategy dealing with challengers, as well as (2) the *configuration of power*, mainly in the party system and the corporatist arrangements.

*Cleavage Structure: Between Pacification and Transformation*

The class and religious cleavages have been regarded as the two dominant ones in the Swiss context, forming a two-dimensional political space with an economic and a cultural dimension (Kriesi 1998). The importance of these two cleavages, as well as that of the center-periphery and urban-rural cleavages, has declined over the last decades (e.g. Hug and Trechsel 2002; Lachat 2008). Their pacification created space for the emergence of new political divisions.

In turn, *new structuring conflicts* have developed since the late 1960s. A first transformation occurred in the course of the educational revolution during the 1960s and 1970s. Across Western Europe, authors observed the rise of a “new value” (e.g. Inglehart 1977), “new politics” (e.g. Müller-Rommel 1984), or “new class” (e.g. Kriesi 1989) cleavage. In line with the last approach, a division emerged within the new middle class between managers and social-cultural specialist (e.g. Oesch 2006). The latter form the structural core of the new social movements that were regarded as the most forceful expression of the new cleavage (Kriesi 1989). These movements, which criticize the unintended side-effects of modernization, advocate cultural liberalism, reject bureaucratic organization, and emphasize direct political participation, contributed to a first transformation of the cultural dimension of the cleavage structure. As Kitschelt (1994: 27) most convincingly showed, the religiously defined dimension transformed into an opposition between culturally liberal or libertarian views, on the one hand, and traditional authoritarian ones, on the other.

In the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, some authors observed a certain institutionalization of the new social movements, which lost their strength in structuring political protest and were integrated into more formal arrangements (Giugni and Passy 1999). At the same time, the societal dynamics leading to the rise of the new social movements resulted in a “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992). In its wake, new political potentials advocating national and ethnic distinctiveness manifested themselves.
Some have argued that the processes of globalization reinforced these tendencies and led to the emergence of a new cleavage between openness and tradition (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Sardi and Widmer 1993) or between integration and demarcation (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). At a general level, this is a conflict between advocates and opponents of economic, political and cultural integration. According to Kriesi et al. (2008), the socio-cultural base of this dividing line is formed by the so-called losers and winners of globalization, who differ in social class, educational level, and their attachment to the national community. Lachat (2008) shows how the new cleavage changed the Swiss (party) political space on the side of the electorate and party competition. Furthermore, he highlights that the transformation affected again mainly the cultural dimension of the political space, leading to its second transformation. Conflicts related to new social movement issues and issues centering on European integration and immigration have become aligned on one, highly salient dimension. However, as Kriesi et al. (2008) at least theoretically stress, conflicts related to (economic) globalization can also reinvigorate the economic dimension. They expect not a mere revitalization of the old class cleavage (Della Porta 2007a), but a reinforced and transformed opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position, whereby new cross-class coalitions arise and the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets is stressed.

Institutional Opportunities and Informal Strategies: Between Stability and Internationalization

In comparative terms, social movements in Switzerland face a rather open institutional context. Using the distinction between weak and strong states (Badie and Birnbaum 1979), Kriesi et al. (1995: 27ff.) classify Switzerland under the first category due to its federal structure, proportional representation, multiparty government coalitions with rather undisciplined parties, weak public administration, and the presence of direct-democratic instruments. All these aspects facilitate the mobilization of social movements. However, their action repertoire is rather moderate, because the opportunities provided tend to encourage rather institutionalized protest strategies and discourage confrontational and violent ones.

During the last three decades, the national institutional context has not changed as much that we would expect significant differences in the strategies used by social movements. Switzerland is still a typical – even though no longer an extreme – case of weak state and consensus democra-
cy (Vatter 2008). However, looking at the broader, transnational political context, some important transformations have occurred. Even though nation-states as political actors and sites of political mobilization have by no means become obsolete, they are increasingly embedded into multiple and diverse new structures of governance beyond the nation-state. Concepts such as “multi-level governance” (Marks 1993), “networked state” (Castells 1996), “complex sovereignty” (Grande and Pauly 2005), or “complex internationalism” (Tarrow 2005) all try to grasp these changes. The new structures constitute “coral reefs” (Tarrow 2005: 27) for protest politics, i.e. they provide new opportunities and threats for transnational mobilization, for example, in the form of domestication, cooperative, or collective transnationalism (Imig and Tarrow 2001a; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). In addition, studies of how Swiss decision-making processes have changed due to an increasing internationalization give some further insights (for a recent overview of the literature, see Fischer 2006). In brief, these analyses show how closely not only surrounded, but integrated and shaped Swiss decision-making has become by internationalization processes, i.e. by the development of new governance structures beyond the nation-state. Most analyses, furthermore, point out that (1) the executive is strengthened compared to the parliament and non-state actors; (2) the export-oriented business actors are strengthened compared to their domestic counterparts, and in some cases compared to unions; and (3) we witness a certain informalization of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making processes (see, e.g., Klöti et al. 2005; Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini and Nicolet 2004; Sciarini et al. 2002).

Concerning the prevailing strategies, i.e. the strategies typically employed by the state to deal with challengers, the Swiss political system is characterized by a rather facilitative and negotiation-based approach that tends to consensually integrate outsiders (Kriesi et al. 1995: 33ff.). Assessing recent changes in this regard yield an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, there is no indication for a clear breach with this tradition since the 1990s. On the other hand, shifts to – at least compared to the Swiss case – rather exclusive new sites of contention beyond the national level as well as the informalization of decision-making hint at certain changes (see above). They imply an increasingly selective strategy that leaves out less organized, resource-rich, and reformist challengers.

Prevailing strategies and, more generally, the structure of political opportunities find their operational concretization in the policing of protest, defined as “the police handling of protest events” (Della Porta 1995: 55).
In a comparative perspective, the Swiss case follows a rather soft style with low levels of repression, although the policing varies between the softer French- and tougher German-speaking part (e.g. Tackenberg and Wisler 2007). Protest policing is, however, rather selective depending on the movement (Wisler and Giugni 1996). In this regard, some observe a certain coercive shift in the policing of protest during the last few years connected to transnational events and the rise of the global justice movement (Della Porta et al. 2006). For Switzerland, Eggert and Giugni (2007) describe such a more repressive strategy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which they see as a reaction to the surprisingly confrontational nature of the early protests by this movement.3

Configuration of Power: Polarization and the End of Consensus Politics?

In relation to the party system, protest mobilization depends on the strength of allies and their presence in the government (Kriesi et al. 1995; Van Dyke 2003). Alliances are, of course, dependent on the specific movement. As Kriesi et al. (1995) pointed out, the new social movements as a left-libertarian movement family, for example, are above all dependent on the political left. They showed that a unified left in opposition facilitated new social movement mobilization the most. In the case of (extreme) right challengers, however, it is more appropriate to look at the established right or extreme right parties (Koopmans et al. 2005). Furthermore, the literature suggests different logics of how institutional and non-institutional activities relate to each other depending on the broad ideological current of the movement (e.g. Hutter 2009; Kriesi 1995; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). Even if movements of the left participate in party politics, they continue to rely on protest activities. In contrast, movements of the right are expected to reveal an inverse relationship between the two modes (Giugni et al. 2005; Koopmans 1996). Allies are, therefore, expected to be not only located on different sides of the political spectrum, but their effect might differ as well.

Of course, the Swiss political system, with its oversized government coalition, does not show dramatic short-term changes in the alliance structure from one election to the next. But from a movement perspective, the

3 At the protests surrounding the G-8 summit in Evian 2003, the police of Geneva used rubber bullets for the first time. Following Tackenberg and Wisler (2007: 170), the parliamentary debate after those protest events, however, showed the still high influence of a local culture that is very focused on a soft strategy of protest policing.
recent changes seem important. Even though the distribution between the left and the right did not change significantly since the mid-1970s, the internal outlook of the two camps changed considerably. In this regard, the single most important development in Swiss party politics is the rise of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) (Kriesi et al. 2005). From 1991 until 2007, it steadily increased its electoral strength from 11.9 to 28.9 percent. Starting in the 1980s, the SVP changed its traditionally rural-agrarian profile and became one of the most successful populist right parties in Western Europe. By focusing on issues of immigration and European integration, it mobilized the political potentials created by the new cultural integration-demarcation cleavage (Bornschier 2008; Lachat 2008). In this context, the moderate-right lost ground and there was little room left for smaller radical right parties. On the left, we also see some slight changes in the internal distribution from 1975 onwards. The Green party (GPS) was strengthened, whereas the other smaller parties of the radical left became less important. The Social-Democratic Party (SPS) experienced no clear-cut trend as did the three governing parties on the right. Looking at party competition and voters’ attitudes, SPS and GPS are the most forceful opponents of the SVP on the new cleavage between integration and demarcation (see Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Lachat 2008). In general, Swiss party politics became more polarized with the rise of the SVP, which manifests itself in election campaigns (Lachat 2008), left-right placements of local party leaders (Ladner 2006), roll-calls and voting recommendations (Bolliger 2007; Hug and Schulz 2007).

An analogous polarization occurred in the corporatist system, especially in the field of social policy (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 99ff.). Comparing social policy reforms of the 1970s and 1990s, Häusermann et al. (2004) observe a weakening of corporatist bargaining. The social partners are increasingly unable to compromise on important reforms of the Swiss welfare state. For the present argument, it is most noteworthy that the share of congruent voting recommendations between the main peak associations dropped significantly in the 1990s compared to the 1970s and 1980s (Häusermann et al. 2004: 37). Looking at the relevance of collective agreements and the role of the social partners in the implementation of social and economic policies, the crisis of neo-corporatist arrangements seems less dramatic (Oesch 2007: 344ff.). However, both sides – the employers’ associations and the unions – were negatively affected by the developments of the 1990s. Especially the unions have to cope with decreasing member
rates and try to pool their resources through mergers and a closer cooperation across sectoral and confessional boundaries (Oesch 2007: 350ff.).

**Expected Consequences for Protest Politics**

How does the changing political context affect protest politics in Switzerland? Which changes can we expect in the patterns of protest mobilization in recent years? We advance hypotheses on six aspects: levels of mobilization, issue salience, ideological positions, action repertoires, actors involved, and scope of protest.

To begin with, we expect a rising level of mobilization since the 1990s. At least four elements of the changing political context in Switzerland support our hypothesis. Firstly, the further pacification and opening-up of old cleavages leaves room for new mobilization. Furthermore, the political potentials, which have been created through the rise of a new cleavage between integration and demarcation, are quite heterogeneous. One can, therefore, expect that they are earlier and more easily mobilized by issue-specific protest actions, before traditional political actors can incorporate them into their established and more general programs. Secondly, the institutional context and the prevailing strategies in Switzerland are, in comparative terms, still very open for protest mobilization. Even though the same context tends to moderate and institutionalize social movements, it also leaves room for the emergence of new protest cycles, defined as “phase[s] of heightened conflict across the social system” (Tarrow 1998: 142). Thirdly, the processes linking national and transnational politics can also stimulate national protest activities. Fourthly, the increasing polarization in the party and the corporatist system expands the opportunities of new alliance and adversary structures between challengers and established actors (see below).

Second, we expect the issues of protest to reflect the changing Swiss cleavage structure. The issues of protest are, therefore, assumed to be increasingly linked to the new cleavage between integration and demarcation

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4 Most of the trends induced by growing internationalization of decision-making processes tend to exclude less powerful and established challengers from the more institutionalized arenas, which, in turn, makes it more likely that they resort to protest activities to push their claims. At the same time, national mobilization could also be replaced by transnational mobilization at distant places or by a transformation of social movements at the transnational level into rather interest-group like non-governmental organizations (see Keck and Sikkink 1998).
since the 1990s. At the same time, protests related to the (pacified) rural-urban, centre-periphery and religious cleavages should be even less salient than in the 1970s and early 1980s. Looking at the cultural dimension of the new cleavage, as Kriesi et al. (2008) call it, the new social movements and their claims for cultural liberalism were the driving force behind its first transformation and dominated protest mobilization in the 1970s and 1980s (Giugni 1995). In the course of its second transformation in the 1990s, we expect that new issues related to cultural and political globalization (i.e. immigration and European integration) are increasingly present in Swiss protest politics. Regarding the economic dimension, conflicts related to the competitiveness on world markets should also become important issues of protest. In other words, even if the traditional class conflict has been pacified, we can hypothesize that we witness a return of economic issues. Additionally, the polarization between the social partners underlines such an expectation.

Third, the ideological positions advocated in protest politics are strongly influenced by possible political allies within the institutional arenas. We assume that positions in favor of cultural integration and economic demarcation (still) dominate protest politics in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Social-Democrats and the Greens are the strongest advocates of cultural integration in Switzerland. As the SPS is mainly faced by a libertarian competitor on the left (i.e. the GPS), but not by a communist one, it is quite likely that both parties constitute strong institutional allies for protest mobilization favoring cultural liberalism, but also for European integration and against tougher immigration policies. On the right, the rise of the SVP also constitutes a potentially strong institutional ally that advocates, for example, tougher immigration and anti-European integration policies. As stated before, on the right we expect an inverse relationship between the presence within the institutionalized arenas and the use of protest. We therefore assume that the transformation and rise of the SVP does not lead to a growing protest mobilization of its claims. On the contrary, it might inhibit such protest and rather act as an institutional alternative. If the rise of the SVP stimulates protest politics, it might rather be as an adversary, i.e. the changes in party politics might lead to countermobilization in protest politics (on the relation between political opportunity structures and countermovements, see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Regarding economic issues, especially the unions are expected to increasingly support protest events favoring demarcation.
Fourth, with regard to the actors, we expect established actors to become more involved in protest politics since the 1990s. As mentioned earlier, the growing polarization in the party and the corporatist systems expands the opportunities of new alliance and adversary structures between challengers and established actors. In line with the idea of a protest cycle, in such a polarized situation even institutional actors tend to rely on political protest to push their claims. Linked to the different logics of institutional allies, left-wing parties and unions are expected to be at the forefront of this development.

Fifth, the Swiss political context still tends to have a very moderating effect on the movements’ action repertoires. The well organized and equipped challengers who resort to moderate and mass-based actions are encouraged. We therefore expect moderate forms of action to still constitute the lion’s share of protest events in Switzerland. The slight changes pointing to more closed and informal decision-making processes, the rise of rather exclusive transnational sites of contention, and a somewhat tougher policing of protest might lead to a certain radicalization of the action repertoires. However, we expect it to be restricted to certain, transnationally oriented movements.

Finally, concerning the scope of protest, we expect a trend towards a transnationalization of protest, i.e. increasing cross-national linkages between events as well as transnational participants, addresses, and organizations. Based on recent studies (e.g. Della Porta and Caiani 2007; Imig and Tarrow 2001a, 2001b; Rucht 2000), we expect rather gradual changes implied by the supposed power shift beyond the national level. In this context, it therefore seems to be more interesting to focus on the specific forms of such a transnationalization. Looking at the addressees, some theorists would even suggest that the power shifts not only upwards, but also away from the political towards the economic sphere (Beck 2002).

Data and Methods

To confront our hypotheses concerning the impact of the changing political context on protest politics in Switzerland, we use a dataset on protest events that covers the period 1975–2005. The dataset is based on a quantitative content analysis of media reports of protest events. It aims at retrieving and describing such events so as to allow for cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. By doing so, we follow a long-standing tradition of
research on social movements and contentious politics (see, e.g., Kriesi et al. 1981; Tarrow 1989; Tilly et al. 1975). Although part of the data have been previously published (see below), here we present for the first time analyses that cover the entire period. In the following, we briefly summarize core aspects of our data and raise some main criticisms of the method. Finally, differences in the data collection over time are assessed.

The definition of a protest event, the data source, and the sampling strategy are of particular importance in the context of protest event analysis. Our study follows the strategy proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995). Firstly, the choice of the research objects is not based on a definition of a protest event beforehand, but on a detailed and broad list of forms of action that have a protest nature.\(^5\) Secondly, the data is retrieved from one national quality newspaper (the Neue Zürcher Zeitung). Thirdly, we consulted only the Monday edition of the newspaper. This choice was dictated by the willingness to reduce the amount of work required to collect a high number of events over a long period of time. The Monday edition reports above all events that occur during the weekend. Since we are interested in protest activities and these tend to concentrate during the weekend, our dataset includes a high share of the total events that took place during the period under study. In addition, we coded all protest events that were mentioned in the Monday edition and that occurred up to one week before or after the publication date.\(^6\) It can be shown that this strategy yields valid and reliable data for the kind of analyses we carry out here (Kriesi et al. 1995). For example, Barranco and Wisler (1999) found that about half of the public demonstrations in Swiss cities took place either on Saturday or Sunday. Tests with continuous time data conducted by Koopmans (1995, 1998) for Germany and Giugni (2004) for the United States provide similar results. For Germany, one can compare our selection bias with a more encompassing dataset called ‘Prodat’ (see, e.g., Rucht 2001, 2003).\(^7\) In general, the

\(^5\) The list includes petitions, political festivals as well as demonstrative (e.g. mass demonstrations), confrontational (e.g. hunger strikes, occupations), and violent (e.g. physical attacks, arsons) forms.

\(^6\) In the period 2000–05, 11.0% of all coded events took place on weekdays. Barranco and Wisler (1999) provide the most detailed study of the selection biases in this sampling strategy. In general, their results support this strategy (see below), but they are rather skeptical regarding the Monday bias. They however overestimate its impact, insofar as (1) they compare events taking place on weekends and weekdays, and (2) stress regional biases resulting from the focus on Monday issues.

\(^7\) Prodat covers two newspapers, all Monday issues, and all issues of every forth week.
results show that the national ebbs and flows of protest mobilization are traced accurately by our ‘more restrictive’ sampling strategy (results not shown; see also Koopmans 1998).

Yet protest event analysis in general and the sampling strategy of Kriesi et al. (1995) more specifically have been the object of various criticisms (for methodological discussions, see Earl et al. 2004; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Ortiz et al. 2005). One of the main points is that protest event analysis yields a (distorted) communicative reality rather than social reality. Such distortions are, however, not necessarily problematic. Quite on the contrary, it is precisely the communicative reality that is relevant for the population and the political decision-makers as, with few exceptions, they get to know protest through the media. In this spirit, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993: 116) even state that “a demonstration with no media coverage at all is a nonevent.” Furthermore, some of the distortions can be empirically assessed and used in the interpretation of the results. Thus, Earl et al. (2004: 77) maintain that the quality standards of protest event analysis score well in comparison to other instruments of data retrieval (e.g. surveys). In particular, one needs to take into account the higher likelihood that large and violent events are reported (McCarthy et al. 1996). Furthermore, the use of additional sources in protest event analysis does not necessarily lead to more reliable results (see, e.g., Dolezal and Hutter 2007: 342; Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004: 536). Proximate events to the newspaper’s location are also more likely to be covered (Ortiz et al. 2005). As we are mainly interested in protests that make the “national” news, we assessed the local bias of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Overall, the results support our sampling strategy as not only producing efficient, but also valid results (see also Bar-

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8 The national and regional sections of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung were coded. We have the most detailed information on the specific location of an event and the section, which covered the event, for 2000 until 2005 (N = 435). 24.1% of all events took place in Zurich, 37.4% were covered in the regional section “Zurich and region”, which underlines the regional bias of our source (see Barranco and Wisler 1999). Excluding the events taking place in Zurich and being reported in the regional section respectively does however not significantly affect our general conclusions on Swiss protest politics in the early 2000s. Even our most disaggregated results on the specific issues of protest are not affected. The relative share and rank order of the 22 issue categories (see Table 1) is, for example, very similar if one compares the sample including and excluding the regional section (r = 0.88; rho = 0.94; N = 22 issue categories). Looking at the more aggregate “sets of issues,” the figures are almost the same (r = 0.99; rho = 1.00; N = 6 issue categories). The changes over time in the absolute number of events and participants (see Figure 1) are also not affected by the high share of events covered in the regional section (r = 0.91 and 0.96; N = 6 years). Similar conclusions apply to our other main variables (results not shown).
ranco and Wisler 1999). Finally, the choice of the Monday edition leads to the underrepresentation of certain groups such as workers, peasants, and students (Barranco and Wisler 1999). We do, therefore, not code (official) strikes, but rely on existing statistics (Kriesi et al. 1995). In general, it is most important for the present argument that these biases are consistent over time. Although some authors find rather inconsistent patterns across short-term periods (e.g. monthly, see Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004), most studies stress the considerable stability over time – above all within single newspapers and over longer periods of time (see, e.g., Barranco and Wisler 1999; Earl et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 1996, 2008).

Our empirical basis combines three different datasets: the data covering 1975–89 comes from the original dataset created by Kriesi et al. (1995); the data covering 1990–99 were gathered by one of the present authors at different points in time (see Giugni 2006; Giugni and Passy 1999); the data covering 2000–05 were gathered by the other author in the context of a larger research project. Overall, the data set contains 2’318 protest events. Although the methodology and the key variables are the same for the three datasets, three remarks concerning differences are necessary. Firstly, the most recent data rely on a keyword search in the electronic archive of the newspaper to select relevant articles. We use a very encompassing list of keywords to be more efficient, but also consistent with the manually selected data sets. To grant consistency with the method of retrieval used for the previous period, we coded only the Monday edition of the newspaper like Kriesi et al. (1995). To meet objections (e.g. Maney and Oliver 2001), we performed comparability tests based on the period 1993–99. In sum, the electronic selection yields only slightly more events and the two strategies do not differ significantly concerning the most important characteristics of protest events.

Secondly, the three datasets differ concerning the inclusion of certain variables. The most recent is the most comprehensive and includes, for example, additional variables on transnational characteristics. The main variables are, however, included in all datasets and allow a lon-

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9 The project “National Political Change in a Denationalizing World” is directed by Hanspeter Kriesi (University of Zurich) and Edgard Grande (University of Munich). The project focuses on six Western European countries.

10 The Neue Zürcher Zeitung is electronically available since 1993. We used the electronic editions in the Lexis-Nexis database (http://www.lexisnexis.com).

11 The manual selection by a full-text reading yields 420 protest events, whereas the electronic one yields 446 events (plus 6.2%).
 longitudinal analysis across the whole research period. Thirdly, the last dataset relied on an updated list of issue categories. The only major obstacle for our analysis was the inclusion of a new category for mobilization related to the global justice movement.\(^\text{12}\) Based on a review of scientific and activists’ literature, we identified and recoded two events in our dataset that occurred at the end of the 1990s and belong also into the new category.

**Results**

*Levels of Mobilization*

Two indicators are important in regard to the levels of mobilization: the number of events and that of participants (see Figure 1). The number of events shows a decreasing trend during the 1990s. The figures never reached the high levels of the protest cycle at the beginning of the 1980s. Until the early 2000s, we do not observe a return of protest politics in Switzerland. Such a return remains furthermore rather modest.

Concerning participants, we show two measures to highlight different interpretations. In the first measure, we include petitions and political festivals. In this case, the exceptional nature of the early 1980s is underlined as well. The 1990s are shaped by highly fluctuating numbers of participants with peaks in 1996 and 2003. In five-year periods, the number of overall participants for 1980–84 is almost twice as high as for the other periods. Furthermore, it reached its lowest level in 1985–89 and increased steadily thereafter. In the early 2000s, we witness about the same participation rate.

\(^{12}\) Some observers highlight the trans-issue character of the global justice movement. This is underlined when some speak of a “movement of movements” or of the global justice movements in the plural. Due to its heterogeneity, scholars do not only struggle to define the movement, but it is also not easy to assign specific events it. For example, the different handling of the protests against the war in Iraq 2003 in the edited volume by Della Porta (2007a) is quite instructive. In our analysis, we coded the events according to their principal goal and not, for example, according to their global framing. We only subsumed those events under the global justice movement that mainly criticize neoliberal globalization and directly target an international organization or conference. In other words, we coded, for example, the protests surrounding meetings of the world trade organization (WTO), G-8 and the WEF as global justice movement, but not the anti-war demonstrations in 2003. Even though organizations and networks belonging to the global justice movement mobilized for those events, as single events they mainly put forward classic issues of the peace movement.
level as during the early 1970s. However, if we focus on those events that require higher involvement than petitions and festivals (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995: 21), the period since 1990 is as contentious as the early 1980s. The year 2003, with the demonstrations against the war in Iraq and the G-8 summit in Evian, is by far the one with the highest number of Swiss people in the street. The five-year trend also shows slightly higher numbers in 2000–05\textsuperscript{13} compared to 1980–84.

In sum, the data still stress the highly contentious early 1980s. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Switzerland did not experience such high mobilization levels in terms of events and overall participation. Contrary to our first expectation, the rise in the number of protest activities is restricted to the early 2000s and rather modest. It goes however hand in hand with rising numbers of people involved in more demonstrative actions. Unlike our protest data, the growing strike activity shows a clear resurgence of protest politics in Switzerland from 1975 to 2006 (see Figure 2).\textsuperscript{14} In terms

\textsuperscript{13} We always calculated a five-year average for the six years 2000–05.

\textsuperscript{14} It should be noted that, since they come from different sources, data on protest activities (Figure 1) and strike activity (Figure 2) cannot be directly compared.
of working days lost and even more of participants involved, strike activity increased remarkably since the early 1990s. Thus, the remobilization of the labor movement is not connected to a general and pronounced protest cycle in Switzerland. Why do we not observe such clear “phase of heightened conflict across the social system” (Tarrow 1998: 142) in the 1990s and early 2000s? As we based our expectations particularly on the heterogeneous character of the potentials connected to the new integration-demarcation cleavage and their impact on party politics, we subsequently focus on the issues of protest to look for an explanation.

**Issue Salience and Ideological Positions**

Figure 3 shows the absolute number of protest events across three issue domains that gave rise to protest mobilization in Switzerland: (1) new social movement protests include all events of the peace, environmental (incl. anti-nuclear), solidarity, autonomous, women, and homosexual movements (Kriesi et al. 1995); (2) more traditional issues; and (3) issues related to political and economic integration. The last category is, above all, made up of protest events related to the global justice movement.

Once more, the data show the extraordinary high number of events and the dominant role of the new social movements at the beginning of the 1980s. In three quarters of the years under study, these movements are responsible for the largest number of protests. During the 1990s, their values decline, but Swiss protest politics, albeit on a lower level, is still forcefully shaped by them. Since the early 2000s, they are once again on the rise. Compared to the new social movements, traditional issues did not face such fluctuations during the last decades. In general, however, they show a similar trend. The last category “international integration” increases since 2000. Together with the new social movements, it is responsible for the modest return of political protest in Switzerland recently. At the same time, the figure shows that global justice movement protests by no means dominated the Swiss protest landscape in the early 2000s.

In the following, we focus on five-year periods to study in more detail how the relative distribution across different issue fields changed (see Table 1). Once again, we find that the new social movements are responsible

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15 Even if Oesch (2007: 341ff.) points out the historical and cross-national relativization of the results, the last fifteen years constitute a breach with the more peaceful 1970s and 1980s.
for about half the events in all five-year periods, reaching its highest share in the early 1980s and declining values since then. More important, we observe changes within the movement family. Those parts of the solidarity movement that focus on internal issues (e.g. anti-racism, illegal migrants) show rising shares since the mid-1980s. In the period 2000–05, they triggered the most new social movement events for the first time, which supports the claim made by Koopmans et al. (2005: 3) that “immigration and ethnic relations […] constitute since the early 1990s the most prominent and controversial fields of political contention.” The anti-nuclear movement and those parts of the solidarity movement that focus on external issues (e.g. for/against specific regimes, developmental aid) evolved in the opposite direction. Squatters’ and autonomous movements, which made up the bulk of mobilization in the early 1980s (e.g. the autonomous movement of Zurich), also account for less protests nowadays. In terms of protest events, the environmental and women movements display a certain stability on relatively high and low levels respectively. The peace movement, in contrast, fluctuates rather strongly. Finally, since the mid-1990s, the homosexual movement is slightly more present in the Swiss protest landscape.
Thus, specific movements often follow their own trajectory which does not necessarily reflect the more general trend for the entire movement family. This may stem from several reasons, which have to do both with factors internal to the movements and external to them (Giugni and Kriesi 1990). For example, certain movements have a stronger organizational structure which allows them to keep their level of mobilization higher over time. Furthermore, some movements are more dependent on their political environment and therefore their mobilization is to a greater extent subject to ebbs and flows (Kriesi et al. 1995). Finally, movements, such as squatters and autonomous movements, that are strongly embedded in local contexts might also follow a different trajectory than one might predict on the basis of the national political opportunity structures.

This, of course, does not only concerns the new social movements, but applies to other movements as well. In the late 1970s, traditional protest issues still made up one third of all events in our dataset. Thereafter, the figure was considerably lower and reached its lowest level from 1990–94. Since then, we observe rising shares due to a significant rise in farmers’ mobilization (1990–94) and right-wing extremism (2000–05). The figure of the latter is considerably higher than in the preceding periods.
Table 1: Distribution of Protest Events Across Issues and Periods (%)

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<td>0.7</td>
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<td><strong>Other Mobilization</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(537)</td>
<td>(438)</td>
<td>(375)</td>
<td>(293)</td>
<td>(435)</td>
<td>(2'318)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own data.*
In part, the finding also indicates the rise of migration-related issues, i.e. protests by, on behalf and against migrants.\textsuperscript{16} The regionalist movement gave less and less rise to protest mobilization, which is of course related to the pacification of the Jura conflict. Other traditional issues never gave rise to a large amount of events during the period under study.

In contrast, protests by foreigners made up a considerable share of events especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. During this period, around one fifth of all events were initiated by migrants. In the early 2000s, we witness a sharp decline of such activities. If we compare the share of issues centering on the situation in the country of origin (external) with those focusing on the situation in Switzerland (internal), the former always by far outnumber the latter. Koopmans et al. (2005) explain such external orientation of migrants’ mobilization with the unfavorable institutional and discursive opportunity structures that foreigners face in Switzerland (see further Giugni and Passy 2006). We see, however, a slight trend towards higher shares in the internal field as well (e.g. protests by illegal migrants, against racism).

Regarding labor protests, we also observe a certain rise since their lowest share in 1985–89. Taking the bias of our data set into account (Barranco and Wisler 1999), the rise probably occurs on a higher level. However, due to the rise of other issues, the share of labor protests never again reached the high level of the late 1970s. As we have seen earlier, this trend is more pronounced concerning strike activity, which shows a significantly stronger labor movement in the most recent period (see Figure 2).

The last category relates to international integration. In a broad understanding, it includes economic and political integration (e.g. European integration). The former is the overall heading under which we subsume the global justice movement (see Footnote 12). In line with Della Porta (2007b: 6), it advances the general “cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between people across the globe.” In a negative sense, its focus on economic integration becomes more obvious, because its “enemy is singled out as neoliberal globalization” (Della

\textsuperscript{16} This finding is confirmed by a chronology of racist incidences of the Foundation against Racism and Antisemitism (GRA) and of the Society for Minorities in Switzerland (GMS). They show, on the one hand, a decreasing number of violent events after a high mobilization phase during the early 1990s and, on the other, a considerable rise of right-wing extremist demonstrative events (e.g. marches, public appearances, gatherings) since the late 1990s (http://www.gra.ch). Regarding participants, the rise is however less significant (results not shown here).
Still very marginal in the late 1990s, after its national take-off with a demonstration against the WTO in Geneva in 1998 and its transnational take-off in Seattle in 1999, 14.0 percent of all protest events were related to the global justice movement in the early 2000s. Apart from single events (e.g. the anti- and pro-Europe demonstrations in 1995), political integration issues are, however, not present in protest politics.

In general, we conclude that protest politics is still mainly shaped by the issues (i.e. new social movements) that characterized the first transformation of the cultural dimension during the 1970s and early 1980s. Its second transformation did not shake Swiss protest politics as heavily as Swiss party politics (Lachat 2008). This might partially explain why we – contrary to our first expectation – did not witness a clear-cut new protest cycle during the 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, we observe two trends that hint at (emerging) changes. On the one hand, shifts towards events of right-wing extremists as well as of the solidarity movement and foreigners, which directly address the situation in Switzerland, indicate that immigration-related questions are not only prominent in party, but also on the rise in protest politics. On the other hand, we observe a return of economic issues (e.g. labor and global justice movement protests). Overall, protest politics is (still) the business of actors striving for cultural integration and economic demarcation respectively.

**Actors**

Looking at the actors involved, social movement organizations, unsurprisingly, account for the highest and very constant share during the whole period (see Table 2). All other, more established actors (i.e. unions, interest groups, churches, and political parties) are present in 13.8 percent of all events. Our fourth thesis is supported, since their share increases slightly in the early 2000s compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Most striking is the return of unions in Swiss protest politics, i.e. they transform themselves to some extent from “corporatist” into “protest unions” (Della Porta 2006: 71). The share of left parties is rather stable. The SPS and the GPS have become the most prominent actors on the left. Even though the share of right-wing parties increased, they are still less involved in political protest than their left-wing counterparts (1.6% and 6.5% respectively). We can differentiate between the three governing parties on the right only in the last period. However, the data do not show any difference between the SVP, on the one hand, and the CVP and the FDP, on the other. In other words,
Table 2: Distribution of Protest Events by Organization Involved (%)

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<td></td>
<td>44.2</td>
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<td>32.0</td>
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<td>33.8</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(240)</td>
<td>(537)</td>
<td>(438)</td>
<td>(435)</td>
<td>(1'650)</td>
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**Source:** Own data.

**Note:** Data are missing for 1990–99.

the most prominent force of political change in Swiss party politics (i.e. SVP) and its related organizations (e.g. the campaign for an independent and neutral Switzerland, AUNS) are not really present in protest politics, which at least partially explains that their claims are also missing. In view of our different logics of support thesis, it is at the same time interesting that the rise of the SVP is (at least statistically) closely connected to the slight changes of protest issues in the sense of more immigration-related activities (results not shown).

In view of the issues advocated by the parties, we find the expected pattern. SPS and GPS are strong new social movement advocates (73.1% and 82.4% of all supported events) with a slight move away from anti-nuclear to internal solidarity protests (results not shown). In the last period, they also turn increasingly to economic and political integration. When parties on the right participated in protest politics in the 1970s and 1980s, they focused on more traditional issues. During the early 2000s, they also shifted to environmental protection and internal solidarity. We furthermore observe a rising, but still small share of events which social movement
organizations and established actors participated in together in the last period (20.1%). External/internal solidarity (31.2%) and peace (24.7%) are the issues that attracted the highest levels of collaboration. Regarding political parties, it is, as expected, the left that collaborates most with social movement organizations (60.0%). Only 18.5 percent of all events, in which right-wing parties were present, witnessed the presence of social movement organizations.

**Action Repertoires**

When looking at the levels of mobilization, we differentiated between events that require higher personal involvement than others. In the following, we distinguish between five main forms of action: (1) petitions and political festivals, (2) demonstrative forms (e.g. legal demonstrations, camps), (3) confrontational forms (e.g. occupations, hunger strikes), (4) light violence (e.g. limited destruction of property, violent demonstrations), and (5) heavy violence (e.g. arson attacks, violence against persons) (see Kriesi et al. 1995: 267f.).

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<td>6.6</td>
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(N) \((240) (537) (438) (375) (293) (435) (2'318/1'650)\)

**Source:** Own data.  
**Note:** n.a. = **not available.**
The early 1980s were the most confrontational times during our research period, in relative terms (i.e., as far as the ratio between moderate and radical action forms is concerned). The share of confrontative and violent protests reached an all-time high in 1981. Before and after then more moderate forms are overwhelmingly more frequent. We observe, however, a certain radicalization since the 1990s, even though the bulk of mobilization still takes on very moderate action forms. In Table 3, we report the evolution over five-year periods. In all periods, more than half of the events are demonstrative. In addition, heavy violence, even though not absent, is still a marginal phenomenon. There is an increase in confrontational and lightly violent strategies, above all in the last period. Furthermore, our data confirm a more repressive reaction to protest events. In the period 2000–05, we observe the highest rates of police intervention and events with arrests. The absolute number of events with police reaction or arrests is almost the same in 1980–84 as in 2000–05. However, the number of people involved is slightly higher in the earlier period (results not shown).

Concerning the distribution of confrontational and violent events across issues (results not shown), we see that the regionalist and labor movements initiated more than half of those events in the early 1970s. In the following periods, the new social movements – above all the autonomous movement – are responsible for the largest share of these events. In the last period, the autonomous movement, right-wing extremists, and the global justice movement each account for around one fifth of all confrontational and violent events. In sum, the results support our fifth expectation that the Swiss action repertoire is still very moderate. In addition, even though the early 2000s were marked by a slight radicalization, it is restricted to only a few specific movements. In the next step, we analyze if the small trend is, as expected, related to a transnationalization of protest.

**Transnationalization**

In line with prior research (e.g. Della Porta and Caiani 2007; Imig and Tarrow 2001a, b; Rucht 2000), we use different indicators to measure transnationalization, i.e., connections across national boundaries, of protest activities in Switzerland. Initially, we trace the territorial level that a protest addresses and the territorial scope of its issue (see Table 4).

We observe a sudden rise in transnational addressees from 1980–84 to 1985–89. Subsequently, around one third of all Swiss events target a transnational actor or institution. The same pattern holds for the scope of the
Table 4: Transnational Characteristics of Protest Events (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Addressee</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Issue</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Participants</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>93/94: 5.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Event</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>93/94: 3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Organization*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(240)</td>
<td>(537)</td>
<td>(438)</td>
<td>(375/124)</td>
<td>(293)</td>
<td>(435)</td>
<td>(2'318/852)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own data.

Notes: n.a. = not available. * = Organizations are also coded as transnational if they are a Swiss branch of an international organization (e.g. WWF Switzerland).

For the last period, we can differentiate between European and international addressees. Only 6.6 percent of all transnational addressees are European. None directly addresses an institution of the European Union. Furthermore, only 8.7 percent of all events during the early 2000s directly target the economic sphere (i.e. firms or employers’ associations).

Further indicators for transnationalization are the presence of non-Swiss residents, linkages between events in different countries and transnational organizations. Unfortunately, we only have data from 1993 onwards. Regarding transnational participants, the period 2000–05 shows a higher figure than the preceding ones. The share of protests, for which related events in other countries were reported, rose only slightly since the mid-1990s. During the early 2000s, 5.1 percent of all Swiss protest events were linked to events beyond the national boundary. In the last period, we can also distinguish between national and transnational organizations. Using a rather broad definition of transnational organizations, we observe their presence in one tenth of the protests from 2000–05.

Relying on the original typology proposed by Imig and Tarrow (2001a: 17), we combine the variable on transnational linkages (actors in protest) and the level of the addressee (target of protest). In the period 1993–2005, Imig and Tarrow (2001a: 17) distinguish purely domestic protests from domestication (transnational addressee), cooperative transnationalism (national addressee and transnational linkages), and collective transnationalism (transnational addressee and transnational linkages).
34.4 percent of the events feature at least one transnational dimension. 86.4 percent of these protests are cases of domestication, i.e. national events without any transnational linkages target a transnational addressee. Events in the form of collective transnationalism, i.e. cross-nationally linked events that address a transnational target, are however on the rise (3.5% of all events from 2000–05). If one takes an encompassing definition of the scope of the actors involved, which includes not only transnational links, but also transnational participants and organizations (only possible for the early 2000s), we find that only 59.3 percent of all Swiss events in the last period are purely domestic, whereas 21.2 are cases of domestication, 9.4 of cooperative transnationalism and 10.1 of collective transnationalism.

Until the 1990s, most transnational addressees relate to protests for solidarity (external) and by foreigners addressing the situation outside of Switzerland (results not shown). Apart from the last period, the two issues always account for more than two-thirds of all events that address a transnational level. During the early 2000s, global justice movement events are responsible for the biggest share with 44.1 percent. Concerning participants, the global justice movement also stands apart with 41.2 percent from 2000–05. No other issue accounted for such a high share during the whole research period. Looking at the action repertoire of transnational events, Imig and Tarrow’s (2001b: 43) finding that they are more moderate than purely domestic ones is only supported until the late 1990s (81.1% vs. 68.2% demonstrative events). In the last period and as expected, transnational events are for the first time more radical (61.0% vs. 69.2%). At least for the Swiss case, the peaceful character of transnational events can, therefore, no longer be confirmed for the early 2000s. Concluding, we observe trends towards an increasing transnationalization of Swiss protest politics. However, the shifts (1) occurred earlier than expected (at the end of the 1980s), (2) are very dependent on the issue and (3) mainly concern the addressee and the scope of the issue. Thus, when Swiss protest events are transnationalized, they are domesticated. In other words, protests without any transnational linkages target an addressee beyond the national level. In the early 2000s, we observe slight changes as collective transnationalism is on the rise and seems to be connected to a certain radicalization of protest events, even in the inclusive political context of Switzerland.

Other, less transnationalized issue fields show similar shares as known from other research project, e.g. 4.1% of all environmental protests target an international addressee (see Rucht 2000).
Conclusion

In the present article, we linked the changing political context of protest politics in Switzerland with data on protest events covering the period from 1975 to 2005. In a first step, we traced continuities and changes in the general structural setting for political mobilization (i.e. cleavage structure, institutional opportunities and informal strategies) and the configuration of power (in the party and corporatist systems). Thereafter, we presented expectations regarding the impact of these political opportunity structures on the level, issue salience and ideological positions, actors, action repertoires as well as the transnationalization of Swiss protest politics. In general, we assumed an emerging new protest cycle in the 1990s and early 2000s, resulting mainly from the rise of a new integration-demarcation cleavage in Swiss politics.

Overall, we witness a resurgence of protest activities in the early 2000s. In a longitudinal perspective, it is, however, rather moderate. Additionally, the new social movements still dominate Swiss protest politics. Although economic and immigration-related questions gained in salience, the changes are not as dramatic as in the case of party politics. In other words, the second transformation of the cultural dimension did not shake Swiss protest politics as heavily as Swiss party politics during the 1990s and early 2000s (see Lachat 2008). On the one hand, the SVP and its claims of cultural demarcation, which most forcefully changed the party political landscape, are more or less absent in protest politics. On the other hand, if the new political potentials gave rise to protest, it took the form of counter-mobilization, i.e. actors mobilized in favor of immigrants. European integration, as the other new major topic of party competition, is almost totally absent from Swiss protest politics.

Even though they are not integrated into a pronounced new protest cycle, the early 2000s are marked by the global justice movement. In this context, we observe a slight radicalization of the action repertoire and police reactions, which are at least partially explained by the emergence of new “transnational” sites of contention (e.g. WEF and G-8 meetings). Our results counter Imig and Tarrow’s (2001b) finding that transnational activities are less confrontational than purely domestic ones. It is striking, however, that the rise of transnational activities occurred during the late 1980s and not as expected in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As in other cases, domestication, defined as national actors targeting transnational addressees, is still the dominant form of transnational protest activities in Switzerland.
The early 2000s are marked by rising numbers of events that not only demand action from a transnational actor, but are also linked transnationally. It remains an open question if these trends are lasting features of Swiss protest politics in a globalizing world or only temporary phenomena.

References


Protestpolitik in einem sich wandelnden politischen Kontext: Schweiz, 1975–2005

Cet article analyse si et comment les changements récents dans le système politique Suisse ont influencé différents aspects de la politique contestataire (par exemple, le niveau, les enjeux, les répertoires d’action, et la transnationalisation). Nous avançons l’argument que des opportunités pour la mobilisation ont émergé dans les années récentes suite à des changements dans le contexte politique institutionnalisé et que ces changements ont, du moins en partie, amené à une résurgence des activités de protestation au début des années 2000. Dans une perspective longitudinale, cette résurgence reste cependant modérée. De plus, les nouveaux mouvements sociaux dominent toujours la politique contestataire suisse. Bien que les questions sociales et celles liées à l’immigration aient gagné de la saillance, ces changements ne sont pas si dramatiques que dans le cas de la politique partisane. La montée d’un nouveau clivage intégration-démarcation n’a pas (encore) secoué la politique contestataire suisse de façon si forte que l’a fait la politique partisane avec la montée de l’UDC à partir des années 1990. Finalement, bien qu’il ne s’insère pas dans un nouveau cycle de protestation prononcé, le début des années 2000 est marqué par le mouvement pour une justice globale. Dans ce contexte, nous observons une légère radicalisation du répertoire d’action et des réactions policières, qui sont, du moins en partie, expliquée par l’émergence de nouveaux sites de contestation “transnationaux”.

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